

Document 1

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DATE 08-Sep-2011

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 29 2013

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5052 9552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 29 JAN 2013 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in Full: \_\_\_\_\_  
Declassify in Part: X  
Reason: (C), (D), (F)  
MDR: 11-M-1199-A1

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Date: JAN 29 2013



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 11/16/2012  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

7/30 1606 8/5

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Dept. of State, A/GIS/IPS, Sherry D. Walter

( ) Classify as ( ) Extend as ( ) Downgrade to ~~SECRET~~

Date 8/1/12 Declassify on \_\_\_\_\_ Reason \_\_\_\_\_

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG 3 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

See Def  
from Paul W.

Subject:

Letters to Prime Minister Bhutto, President  
Ghulam Ishaque Khan, and Prime Minister Singh

Following the NSC meeting of July 16, 1990, we have developed a proposed diplomatic strategy on the Pakistan nuclear problem. We recommend that the President send letters to Prime Minister Bhutto and President G. I. Khan of Pakistan saying that Pakistan needs to take corrective action in order for him to certify, as required by the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device (drafts at Tabs 1 and 2 respectively). We also recommend a Presidential letter to Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh, continuing our earlier request for confidence building measures designed to reduce the risk of conflict with Pakistan and also urging India to undertake measures to strengthen non-proliferation in the region (draft at Tab 3). We recommend sending an envoy to both Pakistan and India, to strengthen the regional aspect of the strategy and to avoid prematurely placing a public spotlight on our nuclear problems with Pakistan. The selection and timing of an envoy may be decided once we have determined the substance of our message.

We have considered two approaches to Pakistan. The choice between them depends critically on whether we believe that President will be able to certify on the basis of measures short of inspection of stockpiles of high enriched uranium (HEU). If so, the first option, which the State Department recommends, is preferable. If inspection is going to be sine qua non for certification, the alternative option is preferable. We judge it extremely unlikely that the GOP will accept of any of these conditions -- especially US inspection of unfabricated HEU. We should therefore recognize that we may have to face non-certification in October.

1. Name: Brent Scowcroft  
2. Classification: Secret  
3. Date: 11/16/2012  
4. Authority: Chief, Declassification Division, WHS  
5. Date: 8/1/12  
6. Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

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The option recommended by the State Department involves asking Pakistan to demonstrate tangibly that it is complying with the three steps we had earlier told them are essential for certification (cease production of highly enriched uranium, refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal, ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components). We would give the GOP a non-paper asking that they propose specific steps which they would take to demonstrate their compliance, and we would suggest by way of illustration various ways in which this might be done. Examples would include permitting the U.S. to inspect an appropriate quantity of Pakistan's HEU to verify that it is not-fabricated into nuclear cores, and ceasing production of HEU and placing its enrichment facility or a quantity of its low enriched uranium (LEU) under safeguards each year. (Non-paper at Tab 4)

This approach puts the onus on Pakistan to demonstrate its compliance. We would then review their response to see whether the steps they propose give us a reasonable basis for certification. The Department's view is that, even if they do not include US inspection of Pakistan's HEU, these actions could provide sufficient indications that Pakistan's intention is to refrain from possessing a nuclear core so as to meet U.S. requirements. We have no reason at this point to prejudge for the President precisely what mix of Pakistani actions would be needed for certification.

We believe that non-certification would spark an accelerated Indo-Pak nuclear race, putting the pro-nuclear elements in both governments under highly public and emotional pressure to move ahead full tilt. It could also increase the risk of war. Demanding inspection of all Pakistan's HEU has almost no chance of acceptance. In these circumstances, if we believe the Pressler standard can be met with less than inspection of HEU, we should not limit the President's ability to certify by setting our standards at an unrealistically high level.

--The alternative option would be to insist on inspecting Pakistan's entire HEU stockpile to determine that it is not in the form of fabricated components. Proponents of this option argue that, given the weight of the intelligence, nothing less will permit the President to certify. If this is the case, we would be wrong to suggest to Islamabad that anything less will be acceptable. Otherwise, should the GOP comply with the lesser of our requests and the President then elect not to certify, Pakistan would justifiably feel it had been misled, and we could justifiably be charged with having failed to communicate clearly what was required, on a critically important issue.

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Since even HEU inspection would leave Pakistan in a position to re-fabricate quickly, we would also, under this second option, ask the GOP to cease production of HEU and cease high explosive tests and other R&D activities related to nuclear device design, as a way to improve our confidence that Pakistan had decided not to cross the possession threshold. To avoid misunderstanding, however, these steps should be characterized as "highly desirable," while HEU inspection would be termed "essential." (Non-paper at Tab 5)

The Intelligence Community has cleared the letters and non-papers for release to the intended governments.

J. Stapleton Roy  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Letter to PM Bhutto
2. Letter to President Khan
3. Letter to PM Singh
4. Non-Paper to Pakistan (State Department Recommended)
5. Non-Paper to Pakistan (Alternative)

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TSFOGEN 19  
CLEARANCE:

PM-Bill ROpe *WR*  
S/P - Bill Burns! *UB*  
T - Steve Aoki *SA*  
P - Mike Malinowski *MM*  
PAB - Ed Abington *EA*  
L - Jon Schwartz *JK*  
S/NP - Gary Samore *GS*  
OES - Dick Stratford *DS*  
INR - Peter Burleigh *PB*  
D - LLitzenberger *LL*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

Dear Madam Prime Minister:

In the time we have both been in office, the United States and Pakistan have worked hard to strengthen the long-standing partnership between our two peoples. This has been a source of great satisfaction to me. I know you share this view, and also my determination to strengthen the US-Pakistan relationship. In the spirit of frankness I promised when you visited, Washington, however, I must write you now to ask your cooperation in resolving a problem which threatens to undo our close collaboration.

We have discussed the Pakistan nuclear program a number of times in the past. Following our talks in Washington in June 1989, you provided assurances to me and to the Congress that Pakistan would not develop a nuclear explosive device. I had outlined three steps which were essential to permit us to provide the certification required under our law for continued assistance:

-- Cease production of highly enriched uranium;

Her Excellency  
Benazir Bhutto,  
Prime Minister of the Islamic,  
Republic of Pakistan,  
Islamabad.

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-- Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal; and

-- Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.

In recent months, we have received information indicating that the status of your nuclear program has changed, and that Pakistan may not be conforming to these three essential steps. This is deeply disturbing to me and my government, particularly in view of my responsibilities under the Pressler Amendment. I must in all honesty advise you that in order for me to certify again this year, Pakistan must demonstrate to the United States that it does not possess a nuclear explosive device. My special envoy will discuss with you how this might be done.

I urge you to take action forcefully and soon. The close partnership between Pakistan and the United States has contributed much to both nations' security. Maintaining it should be a high priority for both of us. The search for a resolution of present tensions in the region and our joint quest for a political settlement in Afghanistan can best be pursued through continued close collaboration between us. Continuing on the nuclear path, far from enhancing Pakistan's

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security, will expose Pakistan to heightened risks in the region, with reduced international support. As a friend of Pakistan, I look on that prospect with alarm, and urge you to take concrete steps to prevent it.

Sincerely yours,

George Bush

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT KHAN

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 29 2013

Dear Mr. President:

In the time we have both been in office, the United States and Pakistan have worked hard to strengthen the long-standing partnership between our two peoples. This has been a source of great satisfaction to me. I know you share these sentiments, and also my determination to do everything possible to preserve and enhance our security ties. I am therefore writing to seek your cooperation in solving a problem which threatens to undo our close collaboration.

We have discussed the Pakistan nuclear program a number of times in the past. The Government of Pakistan has provided assurances that Pakistan would not develop a nuclear explosive device. Last year, we outlined three steps which were essential to permit us to provide the certification required under our law for continued assistance:

- Cease production of highly enriched uranium;
- Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal; and

His Excellency  
Ghulam Ishaq Khan,  
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,  
Islamabad.

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-- Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.

In recent months, we have received information indicating that the status of your nuclear program has changed, and that Pakistan may not be conforming to the three essential steps outlined above. This is deeply disturbing to my government particularly in view of my responsibilities under the Pressler Amendment. I must in all honesty advise you that in order for me to certify again this year, Pakistan must demonstrate to the United States that it does not possess a nuclear explosive device. My special envoy will discuss with you how this might be done.

You have devoted your life to public service, and know better than most people what it means to put the needs of the nation first. In that spirit, I urge you, in conjunction with your colleagues, to take action forcefully and soon. The close partnership between Pakistan and the United States has

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contributed much to both nations' security. The search for a resolution of present tensions in the region and our joint quest for a political settlement in Afghanistan can best be pursued through continued close collaboration between us. Without that continued collaboration, achieving the objectives we have both worked so hard for could be jeopardized. Continuing on the nuclear path, far from enhancing Pakistan's security, will expose Pakistan to heightened risks, with reduced international support. As a friend of Pakistan, I look on that prospect with alarm, and urge you to prevent it.

Sincerely yours,

George Bush

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER SINGH

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have continued to follow events in South Asia closely since hearing Bob Gates' report on his trip to the area in May. I am heartened to note that an active dialogue has resumed between India and Pakistan, and that you continue to work on confidence building measures, as you discussed in your letter to me of May 28.

In spite of these encouraging trends, however, I believe that the region faces grave risks, and that we need to take advantage of the present period of reduced tensions to put in place a system which will provide better insurance against a conflict which neither India nor Pakistan wants.

One element in this system is agreement on confidence building measures. I know this is already part of your dialogue with the Government of Pakistan. I urge you to move ahead. The United States is prepared to share with you information on how our own confidence building regime with the Soviet Union has worked. You may also be able to gain some insights directly from the Soviet Union.

His Excellency  
V. P. Singh,  
Prime Minister of India,  
New Delhi.

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Another element, even more important in the longer run, is nuclear nonproliferation. It has for some time been generally agreed that India and Pakistan are close to the nuclear weapons threshold. Your agreement with Pakistan not to attack each other's nuclear facilities was a first attempt to deal with the dangers inherent in this situation. I urge you, and have urged Pakistan, to bring this agreement fully into effect by exchanging instruments of ratification and data on your respective facilities.

But it is important to go beyond this beginning. Nuclear nonproliferation policy concerns have led to the enactment of a number of U.S. laws. I urge India and Pakistan to develop further mutual steps which will remove the spectre of nuclear weapons from your region. One possibility would be to jointly expand the scope of international safeguards on both countries' nuclear programs. I am also urging the USSR and China to participate in an effort to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Subcontinent.

Our own experience with the Soviet Union now includes an agreement to ban an entire class of nuclear weapons. We are continuing to work hard with the Soviet government to achieve further reductions under a START agreement, and will continue

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to work in subsequent negotiations to limit and reduce all forms of nuclear weapons. I hope this can serve to reinvigorate the search for more effective techniques to reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction in other tense regions of the world.

I take great satisfaction from the strides we have made in developing Indo-US relations, and hope we will be able to work together to enhance the peace and stability of the world.

Sincerely yours,

George Bush

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NONPAPER FOR PAKISTAN

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(This paper is intended to explain the serious problem we face with certification and to suggest corrective measures that Pakistan can take to resolve this problem.)

After the formation of a new government in Pakistan last year, we had extensive discussions on the nuclear issue. We told you that "to make future certification possible, it is essential that Pakistan refrain from any steps leading to the possession of a nuclear device and that Pakistan demonstrate an intention not to acquire material that could be used to manufacture such devices." In particular, we identified three steps as essential for certification, and we would like to review why we consider each of these steps to be essential.

1. Cease production of highly enriched uranium.

Pakistan's decision to cease production of highly enriched uranium last year demonstrated to us the commitment of the new government to reverse the previous government's movement toward the acquisition of nuclear explosives. We warned you last year that if Pakistan should reverse course and return to the production of highly enriched uranium, it would be seen in the U.S. that the government of Pakistan was merely engaging in a temporary ploy or was unable to control Pakistan's nuclear program. In either case, it would seriously damage the Prime Minister's reputation and undermine the credibility of Pakistan's assurances that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons.

2. Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal.

Refraining from production of highly enriched uranium metal is also essential because the conversion of highly enriched uranium in UF<sub>6</sub> form to metal form inevitably suggests that a decision has been made to proceed towards production of a nuclear device. Moreover, the production of highly enriched uranium metal makes it extremely difficult to define any technically significant stopping point short of fabricating a nuclear device.

3. Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.

We emphasized on many occasions that the fabrication and possession of highly enriched uranium metal device components (called nuclear cores) presents the most serious problems for certification because assembly of a nuclear device is not

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
required to possess a nuclear device under U.S. law. Pakistan must not possess even one highly enriched uranium core.

Although the President certified last year that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, recent developments have undermined our confidence that Pakistan is observing the three steps which we have said are essential for certification.

To make certification possible this October, Pakistan must first demonstrate tangibly to the U.S. that it does not possess a nuclear device by showing that its actions are in accord with these three conditions. We ask that Pakistan inform us of what actions it proposes to take to demonstrate its compliance with these three steps.

By way of illustration, there are a number of ways that Pakistan can demonstrate that it has reduced enrichment levels. The most convincing step Pakistan could take would be to submit its enrichment activities to international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As an alternative to safeguarding the activities, Pakistan could make arrangements with the IAEA to safeguard the low enriched uranium product of its enrichment activities. For example, such material could be stored and safeguarded at a different location than the production facility. This would provide Pakistan with a stockpile of low enriched material that could be used to fabricate fuel for a nuclear power reactor.

We also look forward to your ideas on how to demonstrate that Pakistan has ceased production of highly enriched uranium metal and does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.



OSD 1.4(c),(d),(f)

We appreciate that you will need some time to consider these proposals. However, given the short time remaining before the certification requirement falls due, we will need a response by the end of August.

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NON-PAPER FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

[Alternative]

After the formation of a new government in Pakistan last year, we had extensive discussions on the nuclear issue. We told you that to make future certification possible, it was essential that Pakistan refrain from any steps leading to the possession of a nuclear device and demonstrate an intention not to acquire material that could be used to manufacture such devices. In particular, we asked that Pakistan take three steps which were essential for certification:

- Cease production of highly enriched uranium;
- Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal; and
- Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.

As the President states in his letters to the Prime Minister and President of Pakistan, in recent months we have received information indicating that the status of Pakistan's nuclear program has changed, and that Pakistan is not conforming to these essential steps. This will make certification under the Pressler Amendment impossible unless Pakistan is able to demonstrate that it does not possess a nuclear device.

For the President to be able to make the factual finding required by the Pressler Amendment, he must be able to satisfy himself that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device in any form. Mere disassembly of an otherwise complete set of nuclear device components will not suffice. In view of this requirement, and of the concerns noted by the President, we must now ask Pakistan to take an additional step which in our view is essential to ensure that the conditions for a certification are being met.

This step would be to allow U.S. personnel to visit storage facilities to confirm that none of Pakistan's stockpile of highly enriched uranium had been fabricated into nuclear device components. Such action on Pakistan's part would demonstrate that Pakistan has refrained from possession of any highly enriched uranium in the form of nuclear device components.

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In addition to this essential step, which addresses the central issue of the Pressler Amendment certification, we believe that additional actions by Pakistan would be highly desirable, in order to establish strong confidence in Pakistan's commitment to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. These would include a cessation of research and development activities related to nuclear weapons, including high explosive tests, and a cessation of any production of highly enriched uranium.

We appreciate that you will need some time to consider this proposal, and that we are suggesting steps of extraordinary political sensitivity for your government. We believe an approach of this sort is necessary, however, if we are to preserve the assistance program that serves the important security interests of both our countries. In view of the short time remaining before we must address the Pressler certification question, we would appreciate a response to our proposal as promptly as possible.

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# DATA AUTHORIZATION INPUT FORM

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Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.6

Date: JAN 29 2013

## SECTION I --- MISC CONTROL DATA

DATE RECEIVED: 7 Aug 90

OSD CONTROL #: X53889

CONTROLLED ITEM: ORIG RCT(C) / PG(S) 3, CT NO THRU OF CTS, ENCL(S) 5

COVER MEMO: ORIG RCT(S) PG(S), CT NO THRU OF CTS, ENCL(S)

REPLY TO: INTERIM REPLY TO: REF(S)

DESTRUCTION DATA: EFA ( )

## SECTION II --- MICROFILME & FILE DATA

MICROFILME: YES NO REF: 50307 PICNO: B

FILE NUMBER: Pakistan IMAGE(S): A5 B2

## SECTION III --- ACTION/SUSPENSE STATUS

ACTION: FOR: SUSPENSE DATE: EXPO:

COMMENTS: CAF

## SECTION IV DISTRIBUTION

DC	21 WL	COM	DJR
D		ADM	DLA
ED		FMP	EAA
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		BAP	EDR

Document 2

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Office of the Secretary of Defense S.O.S. 63552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 29 JAN 2013 Authority: EO 13526  
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
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Dept. of State, A/GIS/IPS, Sheryl L. Walter

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Date 9/17/92 Declassify on Reason

Downgraded to SECRET  
Date 01-09-2013  
Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letters to Prime Minister Bhutto, President  
Ghulam Ishaque Khan, and Prime Minister Singh

Following the NSC meeting of July 16, 1990, we have developed a proposed diplomatic strategy on the Pakistan nuclear problem. We recommend that the President send letters to Prime Minister Bhutto and President G. I. Khan of Pakistan saying that Pakistan needs to take corrective action in order for him to certify, as required by the Pressler Amendment, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device (drafts at Tabs 1 and 2 respectively). We also recommend a Presidential letter to Indian Prime Minister V. P. Singh, continuing our earlier request for confidence building measures designed to reduce the risk of conflict with Pakistan and also urging India to undertake measures to strengthen non-proliferation in the region (draft at Tab 3). We recommend sending an envoy to both Pakistan and India, to strengthen the regional aspect of the strategy and to avoid prematurely placing a public spotlight on our nuclear problems with Pakistan. The selection and timing of an envoy may be decided once we have determined the substance of our message.

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The option recommended by the State Department involves asking Pakistan to demonstrate tangibly that it is complying with the three steps we had earlier told them are essential for certification (cease production of highly enriched uranium, refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal, ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components). We would give the GOP a non-paper asking that they propose specific steps which they would take to demonstrate their compliance, and we would suggest by way of illustration various ways in which this might be done. Examples would include permitting the U.S. to inspect an appropriate quantity of Pakistan's HEU to verify that it is not fabricated into nuclear cores, and ceasing production of HEU and placing its enrichment facility or a quantity of its low enriched uranium (LEU) under safeguards each year. (Non-paper at Tab 4)

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J. Stapleton Roy  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Letter to PM Bhutto
2. Letter to President Khan
3. Letter to PM Singh
4. Non-Paper to Pakistan (State Department Recommended)
5. Non-Paper to Pakistan (Alternative)

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S/P - Bill Burns *UB*  
T - Steve Aoki *SA*  
P - Mike Malinowski *MM*  
PAB - Ed Abington *EA*  
L - Jon Schwartz *JK*  
S/NP - Gary Samore *GS*  
OES - Dick Stratford *DS*  
INR - Peter Burleigh *PB*  
D - LLitzenberger *LL*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

Dear Madam Prime Minister:

In the time we have both been in office, the United States and Pakistan have worked hard to strengthen the long-standing partnership between our two peoples. This has been a source of great satisfaction to me. I know you share this view, and also my determination to strengthen the US-Pakistan relationship. In the spirit of frankness I promised when you visited Washington, however, I must write you now to ask your cooperation in resolving a problem which threatens to undo our close collaboration.

We have discussed the Pakistan nuclear program a number of times in the past. Following our talks in Washington in June 1989, you provided assurances to me and to the Congress that Pakistan would not develop a nuclear explosive device. I had outlined three steps which were essential to permit us to provide the certification required under our law for continued assistance:

-- Cease production of highly enriched uranium;

Her Excellency  
Benazir Bhutto,  
Prime Minister of the Islamic,  
Republic of Pakistan,  
Islamabad.

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-- Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal; and

-- Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.

In recent months, we have received information indicating that the status of your nuclear program has changed, and that Pakistan may not be conforming to these three essential steps. This is deeply disturbing to me and my government, particularly in view of my responsibilities under the Pressler Amendment. I must in all honesty advise you that in order for me to certify again this year, Pakistan must demonstrate to the United States that it does not possess a nuclear explosive device. My special envoy will discuss with you how this might be done.

I urge you to take action forcefully and soon. The close partnership between Pakistan and the United States has contributed much to both nations' security. Maintaining it should be a high priority for both of us. The search for a resolution of present tensions in the region and our joint quest for a political settlement in Afghanistan can best be pursued through continued close collaboration between us. Continuing on the nuclear path, far from enhancing Pakistan's

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security, will expose Pakistan to heightened risks in the region, with reduced international support. As a friend of Pakistan, I look on that prospect with alarm, and urge you to take concrete steps to prevent it.

Sincerely yours,

George Bush

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT KHAN

Dear Mr. President:

In the time we have both been in office, the United States and Pakistan have worked hard to strengthen the long-standing partnership between our two peoples. This has been a source of great satisfaction to me. I know you share these sentiments, and also my determination to do everything possible to preserve and enhance our security ties. I am therefore writing to seek your cooperation in solving a problem which threatens to undo our close collaboration.

We have discussed the Pakistan nuclear program a number of times in the past. The Government of Pakistan has provided assurances that Pakistan would not develop a nuclear explosive device. Last year, we outlined three steps which were essential to permit us to provide the certification required under our law for continued assistance:

- Cease production of highly enriched uranium;
- Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal; and

His Excellency  
Ghulam Ishaq Khan,  
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,  
Islamabad.

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-- Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.

In recent months, we have received information indicating that the status of your nuclear program has changed, and that Pakistan may not be conforming to the three essential steps outlined above. This is deeply disturbing to my government particularly in view of my responsibilities under the Pressler Amendment. I must in all honesty advise you that in order for me to certify again this year, Pakistan must demonstrate to the United States that it does not possess a nuclear explosive device. My special envoy will discuss with you how this might be done.

You have devoted your life to public service, and know better than most people what it means to put the needs of the nation first. In that spirit, I urge you, in conjunction with your colleagues, to take action forcefully and soon. The close partnership between Pakistan and the United States has

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contributed much to both nations' security. The search for a resolution of present tensions in the region and our joint quest for a political settlement in Afghanistan can best be pursued through continued close collaboration between us. Without that continued collaboration, achieving the objectives we have both worked so hard for could be jeopardized. Continuing on the nuclear path, far from enhancing Pakistan's security, will expose Pakistan to heightened risks, with reduced international support. As a friend of Pakistan, I look on that prospect with alarm, and urge you to prevent it.

Sincerely yours,

George Bush

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER SINGH

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have continued to follow events in South Asia closely since hearing Bob Gates' report on his trip to the area in May. I am heartened to note that an active dialogue has resumed between India and Pakistan, and that you continue to work on confidence building measures, as you discussed in your letter to me of May 28.

In spite of these encouraging trends, however, I believe that the region faces grave risks, and that we need to take advantage of the present period of reduced tensions to put in place a system which will provide better insurance against a conflict which neither India nor Pakistan wants.

One element in this system is agreement on confidence building measures. I know this is already part of your dialogue with the Government of Pakistan. I urge you to move ahead. The United States is prepared to share with you information on how our own confidence building regime with the Soviet Union has worked. You may also be able to gain some insights directly from the Soviet Union.

His Excellency  
V. P. Singh,  
Prime Minister of India,  
New Delhi.

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Another element, even more important in the longer run, is nuclear nonproliferation. It has for some time been generally agreed that India and Pakistan are close to the nuclear weapons threshold. Your agreement with Pakistan not to attack each other's nuclear facilities was a first attempt to deal with the dangers inherent in this situation. I urge you, and have urged Pakistan, to bring this agreement fully into effect by exchanging instruments of ratification and data on your respective facilities.

But it is important to go beyond this beginning. Nuclear nonproliferation policy concerns have led to the enactment of a number of U.S. laws. I urge India and Pakistan to develop further mutual steps which will remove the spectre of nuclear weapons from your region. One possibility would be to jointly expand the scope of international safeguards on both countries' nuclear programs. I am also urging the USSR and China to participate in an effort to prevent a nuclear arms race in the Subcontinent.

Our own experience with the Soviet Union now includes an agreement to ban an entire class of nuclear weapons. We are continuing to work hard with the Soviet government to achieve further reductions under a START agreement, and will continue

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to work in subsequent negotiations to limit and reduce all forms of nuclear weapons. I hope this can serve to reinvigorate the search for more effective techniques to reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction in other tense regions of the world.

I take great satisfaction from the strides we have made in developing Indo-US relations, and hope we will be able to work together to enhance the peace and stability of the world.

Sincerely yours,

George Bush

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## NONPAPER FOR PAKISTAN

(This paper is intended to explain the serious problem we face with certification and to suggest corrective measures that Pakistan can take to resolve this problem.)

After the formation of a new government in Pakistan last year, we had extensive discussions on the nuclear issue. We told you that "to make future certification possible, it is essential that Pakistan refrain from any steps leading to the possession of a nuclear device and that Pakistan demonstrate an intention not to acquire material that could be used to manufacture such devices." In particular, we identified three steps as essential for certification, and we would like to review why we consider each of these steps to be essential.

### 1. Cease production of highly enriched uranium.

Pakistan's decision to cease production of highly enriched uranium last year demonstrated to us the commitment of the new government to reverse the previous government's movement toward the acquisition of nuclear explosives. We warned you last year that if Pakistan should reverse course and return to the production of highly enriched uranium, it would be seen in the U.S. that the government of Pakistan was merely engaging in a temporary ploy or was unable to control Pakistan's nuclear program. In either case, it would seriously damage the Prime Minister's reputation and undermine the credibility of Pakistan's assurances that it has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons.

### 2. Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal.

Refraining from production of highly enriched uranium metal is also essential because the conversion of highly enriched uranium in UF<sub>6</sub> form to metal form inevitably suggests that a decision has been made to proceed towards production of a nuclear device. Moreover, the production of highly enriched uranium metal makes it extremely difficult to define any technically significant stopping point short of fabricating a nuclear device.

### 3. Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.

We emphasized on many occasions that the fabrication and possession of highly enriched uranium metal device components (called nuclear cores) presents the most serious problems for certification because assembly of a nuclear device is not

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required to possess a nuclear device under U.S. law. Pakistan must not possess even one highly enriched uranium core.

Although the President certified last year that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device, recent developments have undermined our confidence that Pakistan is observing the three steps which we have said are essential for certification.

To make certification possible this October, Pakistan must first demonstrate tangibly to the U.S. that it does not possess a nuclear device by showing that its actions are in accord with these three conditions. We ask that Pakistan inform us of what actions it proposes to take to demonstrate its compliance with these three steps.

By way of illustration, there are a number of ways that Pakistan can demonstrate that it has reduced enrichment levels. The most convincing step Pakistan could take would be to submit its enrichment activities to international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As an alternative to safeguarding the activities, Pakistan could make arrangements with the IAEA to safeguard the low enriched uranium product of its enrichment activities. For example, such material could be stored and safeguarded at a different location than the production facility. This would provide Pakistan with a stockpile of low enriched material that could be used to fabricate fuel for a nuclear power reactor.

We also look forward to your ideas on how to demonstrate that Pakistan has ceased production of highly enriched uranium metal and does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.



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We appreciate that you will need some time to consider these proposals. However, given the short time remaining before the certification requirement falls due, we will need a response by the end of August.

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NON-PAPER FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

[Alternative]

After the formation of a new government in Pakistan last year, we had extensive discussions on the nuclear issue. We told you that to make future certification possible, it was essential that Pakistan refrain from any steps leading to the possession of a nuclear device and demonstrate an intention not to acquire material that could be used to manufacture such devices. In particular, we asked that Pakistan take three steps which were essential for certification:

- Cease production of highly enriched uranium;
- Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal; and
- Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components.

As the President states in his letters to the Prime Minister and President of Pakistan, in recent months we have received information indicating that the status of Pakistan's nuclear program has changed, and that Pakistan is not conforming to these essential steps. This will make certification under the Pressler Amendment impossible unless Pakistan is able to demonstrate that it does not possess a nuclear device.

For the President to be able to make the factual finding required by the Pressler Amendment, he must be able to satisfy himself that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device in any form. Mere disassembly of an otherwise complete set of nuclear device components will not suffice. In view of this requirement, and of the concerns noted by the President, we must now ask Pakistan to take an additional step which in our view is essential to ensure that the conditions for a certification are being met.

This step would be to allow U.S. personnel to visit storage facilities to confirm that none of Pakistan's stockpile of highly enriched uranium had been fabricated into nuclear device components. Such action on Pakistan's part would demonstrate that Pakistan has refrained from possession of any highly enriched uranium in the form of nuclear device components.

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In addition to this essential step, which addresses the central issue of the Pressler Amendment certification, we believe that additional actions by Pakistan would be highly desirable, in order to establish strong confidence in Pakistan's commitment to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. These would include a cessation of research and development activities related to nuclear weapons, including high explosive tests, and a cessation of any production of highly enriched uranium.

We appreciate that you will need some time to consider this proposal, and that we are suggesting steps of extraordinary political sensitivity for your government. We believe an approach of this sort is necessary, however, if we are to preserve the assistance program that serves the important security interests of both our countries. In view of the short time remaining before we must address the Pressler certification question, we would appreciate a response to our proposal as promptly as possible.

# DATA AUTHORIZATION INPUT

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JAN 29 2013

## SECTION I --- MISC CONTROL DATA

DATE RECEIVED: 08 14 90 OSD CONTROL #: X5397  
MO / DAY / YR  
CONTROLLED ITEM: ORIG RCY(C) 1 PG(S) 2, CY NO    THRU    OF    CYS, ENCL(S)     
COVER MEMO: ORIG RCY(S)    PG(S)   , CY NO    THRU    OF    CYS, ENCL(S)     
REPLY TO:   . INTERIM REPLY TO:   . REF(S)     
DESTRUCTION DATA:    EFA: ( )

## SECTION II --- MICROFICHE & FILE DATA

MICROFICHE: YES    NO    NO: 750307 PICHE NO: B  
FILE NUMBER: PAKISTAN IMAGE(S): B8 C10

## SECTION III --- ACTION/SUSPENSE STATUS

ACTION:    FOR:    SUSPENSE DATE:    COORD:     
SUSPENSE STATUS:     
COMMENTS: CAF.

## SECTION IV --- DISTRIBUTION

ADC	CIWI	COM	DJS
SD		ADM	DLA
DSD		FMP	SAA
ES		HA	SDI
ESR		LA	IG
USA		PA	HAD
CBI		RA	MAS
PRL		GC	ADD
RET		OTE	CC
ORE		PAE	DIA
ISP		SA	AE
UP		CSA	NSA
SA		SN	
SP		SAP	SGN
OL		JCS	SDR